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Abstract
We explore the idea that authoring a piece of text is an
act of maximizing one’s expected utility. To make this
idea concrete, we consider the societally important deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Exten-
sive past work in quantitative political science provides
a framework for empirically modeling the decisions of
justices and how they relate to text. We incorporate into
such a model texts authored by amici curiae (“friends of
the court” separate from the litigants) who seek to weigh
in on the decision, then explicitly model their goals in
a random utility model. We demonstrate the benefits of
this approach in improved vote prediction and the abil-
ity to perform counterfactual analysis.
1 Introduction
Some pieces of text are written with clear goals in mind.
Economists and game theorists use the word utility for the
concept of satisfying a need or desire, and a huge array of
theories and models are available for analyzing how utility-
seeking agents behave. This paper takes the first steps in in-
corporating text into these models.
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is the
highest court in the American judicial system; its decisions
have far-reaching effects. While the ideological tendencies
of SCOTUS’ nine justices are widely discussed by press and
public, there is a formal mechanism by which organized in-
terest groups can lobby the court on a given case. These
groups are known as amici curiae (Latin for “friends of the
court,” hereafter “amici,” singular “amicus”), and the textual
artifacts they author—known as amicus briefs—reveal ex-
plicit attempts to sway justices one way or the other. Taken
alongside voting records and other textual artifacts that char-
acterize a case, amicus briefs provide a fascinating setting
for empirical study of influence through language.
We build on well-established methodology from political
science known as ideal points for analyzing votes. Specif-
ically, Lauderdale and Clark (2014) combined descriptive
text and ideal points in a probabilistic topic model. Although
the influence of amici has been studied extensively by legal
scholars (Collins 2008), we are the first to incorporate them
into ideal points analysis (§2). Drawing on decision theory,
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we then posit amici as rational agents seeking to maximize
their expected utility by framing their arguments to influence
justices toward a favorable outcome (§3). We derive appro-
priate inference and parameter estimation procedures (§4).
Our experiments (§5) show that the new approach offers
substantial gains in vote prediction accuracy. More impor-
tantly, we show how the model can be used to answer ques-
tions such as: How effective were amici on each side of
a case? What would have happened if some or all amicus
briefs were not filed? How might an amicus have changed
her brief to obtain a better outcome? Since our approach
characterizes the amicus brief as a (probabilistic) function
of the case parameters, our approach could also be used to
ask how the amici would have altered their briefs given dif-
ferent merits facts or a different panel of justices. Although
we focus on SCOTUS, our model is applicable to any set-
ting where textual evidence for competing goals is available
alongside behavioral response.
SCOTUS Terminology. SCOTUS reviews the decisions
of lower courts and (less commonly) resolves disputes be-
tween states.1 In a typical case, the petitioner writes a
brief putting forward her legal argument; the respondent
(the other party) then files a brief. These, together with a
round of responses to each other’s initial briefs, are collec-
tively known as merits briefs. Amicus briefs—further ar-
guments and recommendations on either side—may be filed
by groups with an interest (but not a direct stake) in the
outcome, with the Court’s permission. After oral arguments
(not necessarily allotted for every case) conclude, the jus-
tices vote and author one or more opinions. In this paper, we
relate the votes of justices to merits and amicus briefs.
2 Ideal Point Models
Ideal point (IP) models are a mainstay in quantitative polit-
ical science, often applied to voting records to place voters
(lawmakers, justices, etc.) in a continuous space. A justice’s
“ideal point” is a latent variable positioning her in this space.
Unidimensional Ideal Points The simplest model for ju-
dicial votes is a unidimensional IP model (Martin and Quinn
1Details about the procedures and rules of the SCOTUS can be
found at http://www.uscourts.gov.
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2002), which posits an IP ψj ∈ R for each justice j.2
Often the ψj values are interpreted as positions along a
liberal-conservative ideological spectrum. Each case i is rep-
resented by popularity (ai) and polarity (bi) parameters.3 A
probabilistic view of the unidimensional IP model is that jus-
tice j votes in favor of case i’s petitioner with probability
p(vi,j = petitioner | ψj , ai, bi) = σ (ai + ψjbi)
where σ(x) = exp(x)1+exp(x) is the logistic function. When the
popularity parameter ai is high enough, every justice is more
likely to favor the petitioner. The polarity bi captures the im-
portance of the justice’s ideology ψj : more polarizing cases
(i.e., |bi|  0) push justice j more strongly to the side of the
petitioner (if bi has the same sign as ψj) or the respondent
(otherwise). While they recover dimensions that maximize
statistical fit, IP models conflate many substantive dimen-
sions of opinion and policy, making it difficult to interpret
additional dimensions.4 Indeed, such embeddings are igno-
rant of the issues at stake, or any content of the case, and
they cannot generalize to new cases.
Issues and Ideal Points Lauderdale and Clark (2014) in-
corporate text as evidence and infer dimensions of IP that are
grounded in “topical” space. They build on latent Dirichlet
allocation (LDA; see Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003), a popu-
lar model of latent topics or themes in text corpora. In their
model, each case i is embedded as θi in a D-dimensional
simplex; the dth dimension θi,d corresponds to the propor-
tion of case i that is about issue (or, in LDA terminology,
topic) d. The probability of justice j’s vote is given by
p(vi,j = petitioner | ψj ,θi, ai, bi) = σ
(
ai +ψ
>
j (biθi)
)
where ψj,d is an issue-specific position for justice j. There-
fore, the relative degree that each dimension predicts the
vote outcome is determined by the text’s mixture propor-
tions, resulting in the issue-specific IP ψ>j θi. In their work,
they inferred the mixture proportions from justices’ opin-
ions, although one can similarly use merits briefs, appeals
court opinions, or any other texts that serve as evidence for
inferring the issues of a case.
Lauderdale and Clark (2014) found that incorporating tex-
tual data in this manner5 addresses the labeling problem for
multidimensional models, and is especially useful for small
voting bodies (e.g., SCOTUS), where estimating multidi-
mensional models is difficult due to few observations and
variation of preferences across issues.
2Martin and Quinn (2002) describe a dynamic unidimensional
IP model where justice IPs vary over time. In this work, we assume
each justice’s IP is fixed over time, for simplicity.
3This model is also known as a two parameter logistic model in
item response theory literature (Fox 2010), where ai is “difficulty”
and bi is “discrimination.”
4A seminal finding of Poole and Rosenthal (1985) is that two
dimensions, corresponding to left-right ideology and geographical
latitude, explain most of the variance in U.S. Congressional votes.
5Of course, LDA is not the only way to “embed” a case in a
simplex. One can take advantage of expert categorization of case
issues. For example, Gerrish and Blei (2012) used bill labels as
supervision to infer the proportions of issues.
Amici and Ideal Points The merits briefs describe the is-
sues and facts of the case. It is our hypothesis that amicus
briefs serve to “frame” the facts and, potentially, influence
the case outcome. Collins (2008) argued that these organized
interest groups play a significant role in shaping justices’
choices. Public interest groups, such as the ACLU and Citi-
zens United, frequently advocate their positions on any case
that impinges on their goals. These briefs can provide valu-
able assistance to the Court in its deliberation; for example,
they can present an argument not found in the merits.6
When filing amicus briefs, amici are required to identify
the side they are supporting (or if neither). However, it is
not trivial to automatically tell which side the amici are on
as these intentions are not expressed consistently. We solve
this by training a classifier on hand-labeled data (§4).
We propose that amici represent an attempt to shift the po-
sition of the case by emphasizing some issues more strongly
or framing the case distinctly from the perspectives given in
the merits briefs. The effective position of a case, previously
biθi, is in our model biθi+c
p
i∆
p
i+c
r
i∆
r
i, where c
p
i and c
r
i are
the amicus polarities for briefs on the side of the petitioner
and respondent. ∆pi and ∆
r
i are the mean issue proportions
of the amicus briefs on the side of the petitioner and respon-
dent, respectively. Our amici-augmented IP model is:
p(vi,j = petitioner | ψj ,θi,∆i, ai, bi, ci)
= σ
(
ai +ψ
>
j
(
biθi + c
p
i∆
p
i + c
r
i∆
r
i
))
(1)
In this model, the vote-specific IP is influenced by two forms
of text: legal arguments put forth by the parties involved
(merits briefs, embedded in θi), and by the amici curiae (am-
icus briefs, embedded in ∆{p,r}i ), both of which are rescaled
independently by the case discrimination parameters to gen-
erate the vote probability. When either |cpi | or |cri| is large
(relative to ai and bi), the vote is determined by the contents
of the amicus briefs. Hereafter, we let κi = 〈ai, bi, cpi , cri〉.
By letting ∆si be the average mixture proportions inferred
from text of briefs supporting side s, we implicitly assume
that briefs supporting the same side share a single parameter,
and individual briefs on one side influence the vote-specific
IP equally. While Lynch (2004) and others have argued that
some amici are more effective (i.e., influence on justices’
votes varies across amicus authors), our model captures the
collective effect of amicus briefs and is simple.
3 Amici as Agents
In the previous section, the IP models focus on justices’ po-
sitions embedded in a continuous space. However, we want
to account for the fact that amici are purposeful decision
makers who write briefs hoping to sway votes on a case.
Suppose we have an amicus curiae supporting side s (e.g.,
petitioner), which is presided by a set of justices, J. The am-
icus is interested in getting votes in favor of her side, that is,
vj = s. Thus, we assume that she has a simple evaluation
6On occasion, SCOTUS may adopt a position not advanced by
either side, but instead urged solely by an amicus brief. Some no-
table cases are: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961) and more
recently, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
function over the outcome of votes v1, . . . , v9,
u(v1, v2, . . . , v9) =
∑
j∈J I(vj = s), (2)
where I is the indicator function. This is her utility.
Cost of writing. In addition to the policy objectives of an
amicus, we need to characterize her “technology” (or “bud-
get”) set. We do this by specifying a cost function, C, that is
increasing in difference between ∆ and the “facts” in θ:
C(∆,θ) = ξ2‖∆− θ‖22
where ξ > 0 is a hyperparameter controlling the cost (rela-
tive to the vote evaluation). The function captures the notion
that amicus briefs cannot be arbitrary text; there is disutility
or effort required to carefully frame a case, or the mone-
tary cost of hiring legal counsel. The key assumption here
is that framing is costly, while simply matching the merits is
easy (and presumably unnecessary). Note the role of the cost
function is analogous to regularization in other contexts.
Expected utility. The outcome of the case is uncertain, so
the amicus’ objective will consider her expected utility:7
max
∆
E∆[u(v1, . . . , v9)]− ξ2‖∆− θ‖22
When an amicus writes her brief, we assume that she has
knowledge of the justices’ IPs, case parameters, and contents
of the merits briefs, but ignores other amici.8 As such, tak-
ing linearity of expectations, we can compute the expected
utility for an amicus on side s using Eq. 1:9
max
∆
∑
j∈J σ
(
a+ψ>j (bθ + c
s∆)
)− ξ2‖∆− θ‖22
Random utility models. There are several conceivable
ways to incorporate amici’s optimization into our estima-
tion of justices’ IP. We could maximize the likelihood and
impose a constraint that ∆ solve our expected utility opti-
mization (either directly or by checking the first order condi-
tions).10 Or, we can view such (soft) constraints as imposing
a prior on ∆:
putil(∆) ∝ E∆[u(v1, . . . )] + ξ(1− 12‖∆− θ‖22) (3)
7We use an evaluation function that is linear in votes for sim-
plicity. The scale of the function is unimportant (expected utility is
invariant to affine transformations). However, we leave for future
work other specifications of the evaluation function; for example a
function that places more emphasis on the majority vote outcome.
8Capturing strategic amici agents (a petitioner amicus choosing
brief topics considering a respondent amicus’ brief) would require
a complicated game theoretical model and, we conjecture, would
require a much richer representation of policy and goals.
9The first-order conditions for amicus’ purposeful maximiza-
tion with respect to ∆ lead to interesting brief writing trade offs,
which can be found in supplementary §A.
10This is reminiscent of learning frameworks where constraints
are placed on the posterior distributions (Chang, Ratinov, and Roth
2007; Ganchev et al. 2010; McCallum, Mann, and Druck 2007).
However, the nonlinear nature of our expectations makes it difficult
to optimize and characterize the constrained distribution.
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Figure 1: Plate diagrams for the IP models (left) and random
utility model (right). J, C and Ai are the sets of justices,
cases, and amicus briefs (for case i), respectively. ψj is the
IP for justice j; κi is the set of case parameters ai, bi, c
p
i and
cri for case i; and α,σ, λ, and ρ are hyperparameters. The
mixture proportion nodes (dashed) are fixed in our estima-
tion procedure. On the left, black nodes comprise the basic
IP model, blue nodes are found in both the issues IP and
amici IP models, while magenta nodes are found only in the
amici IP model.
where the constant is added so that putil is non-negative.
Note, were the utility negative, the amici would have chosen
not to write a the brief. This approach is known as a random
utility model in the econometrics discrete-choice literature
(McFadden 1974). Random utility models relax the preci-
sion of the optimization by assuming that agent preferences
also contain an idiosyncratic random component. Hence, the
behavior we observe (i.e., the amicus’ topic mixture propor-
tions) has a likelihood that is proportional to expected utility.
Considering all the amici, we estimate the full likelihood
L(w,v,ψ,θ,∆,κ)× [∏k∈A putil(∆k)]η (4)
where L(·) is the likelihood of our amici IP model (Eq. 1),
and η is a hyperparameter that controls influence of utility
on parameter estimation.
Eq. 4 resembles product of experts model (Hinton 2002).
For the likelihood of votes in a case to be maximized, it is
necessary that no individual component—generative story
for votes, amicus briefs—assigns a low probability. Accord-
ingly, this results in a principled manner for us to incorpo-
rate our assumptions about amici as rational decision mak-
ers, each of whom is an “expert” with the goal of nudging
latent variables to maximize her own expected utility.
4 Learning and Inference
Model priors. The models we described above combine
ideal points, topic models, and random utility; they can be
estimated within a Bayesian framework. Following Laud-
erdale and Clark (2014), we place Gaussian priors on the jus-
tice and case parameters: ρ ∼ U(0, 1), ψj ∼ N(0, λI + ρ1)
for each justice j, and κi ∼ N(0,σ) for each case i. The
positive off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix for
justice IPs orient the issue-specific dimensions in the same
direction (i.e., with conservatives at the same end) and pro-
vide shrinkage of IP in each dimension to their common
mean across dimensions. Fig. 1 presents the plate diagram
for the IP models (§2) on the left and the random utility
model (§3) on the right.
For the non-utility IP models involving text (§2), LDA is
used to infer the latent topic mixtures of text associated with
the case and amicus briefs, thus θi and ∆k are both drawn
from a symmetric Dirichlet distribution with hyperparame-
ter α and tokens in both sets of texts are drawn from shared
topic-word distributions.11
Our random utility model can be described through a sim-
ilar generative story. Instead of drawing amicus briefs (∆)
from a Dirichlet, they are drawn from the expected util-
ity distribution (Eq. 3). The right side of Fig. 1 shows the
corresponding plate diagram. Importantly, note that ∆ here
serves as direct evidence for the justice and case parameters,
rather than influencing them through v-structures.
Parameter estimation. We decoupled the estimation of
the topic mixture parameters as a stage separate from the
IP parameters. This approach follows Lauderdale and Clark
(2014), who argued for its conceptual simplicity: the text
data define the rotation of a multidimensional preference
space, while the second stage estimates the locations in that
space. We found in preliminary experiments that similar is-
sue dimensions result from joint vs. stage-wise inference,
but that the latter is much more computationally efficient.
Using LDA,12 θ (and, where relevant, ∆) are estimated,
then fixed to their posterior means while solving for jus-
tice parameters ψ and case parameters κ. For the second
stage, we used Metropolis within Gibbs (Tierney 1994), a
hybrid MCMC algorithm, to sample the latent parameters
from their posterior distributions. We sampled κi for each
case and ψj for each justice blockwise from a multivariate
Gaussian proposal distribution, tuning the diagonal covari-
ance matrix to a target acceptance rate of 15–45%. Likewise,
ρ is sampled from a univariate Gaussian proposal, with its
variance tuned similarly. For our random utility model, we
used the same MCMC approach in sampling the latent IRT
variables, but include the expected utility term for each brief
in the likelihood function (eq. 4). Details of our sampler and
hyperparameter settings can be found in the supplementary
materials (§B), while topics and justices’ IPs estimated by
our model are found in §D and §E, respectively.
Data. We focused on 23 terms of the Court from 1990–
2012 (Spaeth et al. 2013),13 using texts from LexisNexis.14
We concatenate each of the 2,074 cases’ merits briefs from
both parties to form a single document, where the text is
used to infer the representation of the case in topical space
(θ; i.e., merits briefs are treated as “facts of the case”). We
did not make use of case opinions as did Lauderdale and
Clark (2014) because opinions are written after votes are
11We omit details of LDA, as it is widely known.
12We used the C++ implementation of LDA by Liu et al. (2011).
13The unit of analysis is the case citation, and we select cases
where the type of decision equals 1 (orally argued cases with signed
opinions), 5 (cases with equally divided vote), 6 (orally argued
per curiam cases), or 7 (judgements of the Court). In addition, we
dropped cases where the winning side was not clear (i.e., coded as
“favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear”).
14http://www.lexisnexis.com
Model Accuracy
Logistic regression w/ topics 0.715 ± 0.008
Unanimous 0.714 ± 0.003
Unidimensional IP 0.583 ± 0.037
Issues IP 0.671 ± 0.008
Amici IP 0.690 ± 0.021
Random utility IP 0.742 ± 0.006
Table 1: Average pairwise vote partition accuracy (five-fold
cross-validation).
cast, tainting the data for predictive modeling. Each amicus
brief is treated as a single document.
As the amicus briefs in our dataset were not explicitly la-
beled with the side that they support, and manually labeling
each brief would be a tedious endeavor, we built a classifier
to automatically label the briefs with the side the amici are
supporting, taking advantage of cues in the brief content that
strongly signal the side that the amici is supporting (e.g., “in
support of petitioner” and “affirm the judgement”).
Additionally, we find that using only phrases (instead of
standard bag-of-words) gave us more interpretable topics
(Sim et al. 2013). Details of our phrase extraction, data pre-
processing steps, and brief “side” classification are in the
supplementary materials (§C).
5 Experiments and Analysis
5.1 Vote Prediction
We evaluate each model’s ability to predict how justices
would vote on a case out of the training sample. To com-
pute the probability of justices’ votes, we first infer the topic
mixture proportions for the case’s merits briefs (θ), and am-
icus briefs (∆). Given all the justice’s IPs ψj , we find the
most likely vote outcome for the case by integrating over
the case parameters κ:
arg max
v
∫
κ
p(κ | σ)∏j∈J p(vj | ψj ,θ,∆,κ)
×∏k∈A putil(∆k | ψ,θ,∆,κ, sk)
where sk is the side brief k supports, and the multiplier is
the expected utility term (Eq. 3) which is ignored for the
non-utility based models.
Due to the specification of IP models, the probability of
a vote is a logistic function of the vote-specific IP, which
is a symmetric function implying that justice j’s probability
of voting towards the petitioner will be the same as if she
voted for the respondent when we negate the vote-specific
IP. Thus, we would not be able to distinguish the actual side
that the justice will favor, but we can identify the most likely
partitioning of the justices into two groups.15 We can then
evaluate, for each case, an average pairwise accuracy score,(
9
2
)−1∑
j,j′∈J:j 6=j′ I[I[vˆj = vˆj′ ] = I[v∗j = v∗j′ ]]
where vˆ (v∗) are predicted (actual) votes.
We performed 5-fold cross validation, and present the
vote partition accuracy in Table 1. We have two naı¨ve base-
lines, (i) where all justices vote unanimously, and (ii) where
15Given the partitioning of justices, domain experts should be
able to identify the side each group of justices would favor.
we trained an `1-regularized logistic regression classifier for
each justice using the concatenated topic proportions of θ
and ∆ as features for each case. The baselines exhibit sim-
ilar accuracies, and perform better than when adjusting for
issues and/or amici. This suggests that justices’ votes do not
always align with their IPs, and that topic models alone may
be inadequate for representing IPs. Furthermore, we believe
there may be insufficient information to learn the amicus po-
larity case parameters (cs) in the amici IP model (which is
slightly better than the issues IP model). However, in the ran-
dom utility model, amici-agents-experts weigh in, providing
additional signals for estimating these parameters, achiev-
ing significantly (paired samples t-test, p < 0.001) better
predictive accuracy than the baseline.
As an additional qualitative validation of our approach,
we compared the log-likelihoods between models that con-
sider vs. ignore amicus briefs. We found correlations with
anecdotal evidence of how justices view the influence of am-
icus briefs (see §F for details).
5.2 Post Hoc Analysis of Votes
On a case level, we can tease apart the relative contribution
each textual component to a justice’s decision by analyzing
the case parameters learnt by our random utility model. By
zeroing out various case parameters, and plotting them, we
can visualize the different impact that each type of text has
on a justice’s vote-specific IP. For example, Fig. 2 shows the
vote-specific IP estimates of justices for the 2011 term death
penalty case Maples v. Thomas (132 S. Ct. 912). The issues-
−15−10−50510
Maples v. Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan
Roberts
Alito
Kennedy
Scalia
Thomas
Issues IP
Amici (Maples)
Amici (Thomas)
Amici + Issue IP
Figure 2: Vote-specific IP estimates decomposed into differ-
ent influences on each justice’s vote on Maples v. Thomas.
An IP towards the left (right) indicates higher log-odds of
vote that is favorable to Maples (Thomas).
only IPs are computed by zeroing out both the amicus polar-
ity parameters (cp and cr). On the other hand, the IP due to
amicus briefs supporting Maples (Thomas) is computed by
zeroing out only cr (cp). We observe that the issues-only IPs
are aligned with each justice’s (widely known) ideological
stance on the issue of capital punishment. For instance, the
issues-only IPs of Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and Roberts, the
strong conservative bloc, favor the respondents (that Maples
should not be awarded relief); so did Kennedy, who is widely
recognized as the swing justice. When effects of all amicus
briefs are taken into account, the justices’ IPs shift toward
Maples with varying magnitudes, with the result reflecting
the actual ruling (7–2 with Thomas and Scalia dissenting).
5.3 Counterfactual Analysis
Following Pearl (2000), we can query the model and per-
form counterfactual analyses using the vote prediction algo-
rithm (§5.1). As an illustration, we consider National Fed-
eration of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius (HHS)
(132 S. Ct. 2566), a landmark 2011 case in which the Court
upheld Congress’s power to enact most provisions of the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA; “Obamacare”).16
In the merits briefs, the topics discussed revolve around
interstate commerce and the individual mandate, while there
is an interesting disparity in topics between briefs support-
ing NFIB and HHS.17 Notably, amici supporting NFIB are
found, on average, to use language concerning individual
mandate, while amici supporting HHS tend to focus more
on topics related to interstate commerce. This is commensu-
rate with the main arguments put forth by the litigants, where
NFIB was concerned about the overreach of the government
in imposing an individual mandate, while HHS argued that
healthcare regulation by Congress falls under the Commerce
Clause. Our model was most uncertain about Roberts and
Kennedy, and wrong about both (Fig. 3 top).
Choosing sides. The first type of counterfactual analysis
that we introduce is, “What if no (or only one side’s) amicus
briefs were submitted in the ACA case?” To answer it, we
hold the case out of the training set and attempt to predict the
votes under the hypothetical circumstances with the random
utility model. Fig. 3 (top) shows the resulting IP of hypothet-
ical situations where no amicus briefs were filed, or when
only briefs supporting one side are filed. If no amici filed
briefs, the model expects that all but Kagan and Sotomayor
would favor NFIB, but with uncertainty. With the inclusion
of the amicus briefs supporting NFIB, the model becomes
more confident that the conservative bloc of the court would
vote in favor of NFIB (except for Alito). Interestingly, the
model anticipates that the same briefs will turn the liberals
away. In contrast, the briefs on HHS’ side have more suc-
cess in swaying the case in their favor, especially the crucial
swing vote of Kennedy (although it turned out that Kennedy
sided with the conservative bloc, and Roberts emerged as the
deciding vote in HHS favor). Consequently, the model can
provide insights about judicial decisions, while postulating
different hypothetical situations.
Choosing what to write. Another counterfactual analysis
we can perform, more useful from the viewpoint of the am-
icus, is, “how should an amicus frame arguments to best
achieve her goals?” In the context of our model, such an
amicus would like to choose the topic mixture ∆ to maxi-
mize her expected utility (Eq. 3). Ideally, one would com-
16The case attracted much attention, including a record 136 am-
icus briefs, of which 76 of these briefs are used in our dataset. 58
(of the 76) were automatically classified as supporting NFIB.
17The merits briefs were estimated at 41% and 20% on the in-
terstate commerce and the individual mandate topics, respectively.
NFIB amicus briefs were 15% on interstate commerce and 41% on
individual mandate; these figures switch to 36% and 22% for HHS
amicus briefs.
−2.0−1.5−1.0−0.50.00.51.01.5
Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan
Roberts
Alito
Kennedy
Scalia
Thomas
Both amici
No amicus
NFIB amici
HHS amici
−0.8−0.6−0.4−0.20.00.20.40.60.8
Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan
Roberts
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NFIB amicus
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Figure 3: Counterfactual analyses for NFIB v. Sebelius
(HHS). Top: What if amicus briefs for one side were not
filed? Bottom: What if a single amicus files an “optimally”
written brief? An IP towards the left (right) indicates higher
log-odds of vote favorable to NFIB (HHS). Hollow markers
denote that prediction differed from the actual outcome.
pute such a topic mixture by maximizing over both ∆ and
vote outcome v, while integrating over the case parameters.
We resort to a cheaper approximation: analyzing the filer’s
expected utility curve over two particular topic dimensions:
the individual mandate and interstate commerce topics. That
is, we compute the expected utility curve (see supplementary
§G) faced by a single amicus as we vary the topic propor-
tions of individual mandate and interstate commerce topics
over multiples of 0.1.
Consequently, the amicus who supports NFIB can expect
to maximize their expected utility (5.2 votes at a cost of
0.21) by “spending” about 70% of their text on individual
mandate. On the other hand, the best that an amicus sup-
porting HHS can do is to write a brief that is 80% about
interstate commerce, and garner 4.7 votes at a cost of 0.31.
We plot the justices’ predicted IPs in Fig. 3 (bottom) using
these “best” proportions. The “best” proportions IPs are dif-
ferent (sometimes worse) from that in Fig. 3 (top) because
in the latter, there are multiple amici influencing the case pa-
rameters (through their utility functions) and other topics are
present which will sway the justices. From the perspective
of an amicus supporting HHS, the two closest swing votes
in the case are Roberts and Kennedy; we know a posteriori
that Roberts sided with HHS.
5.4 Discussion
Our model makes several simplifying assumptions: (i) it ig-
nores the effects of other amici on a single amicus’ writ-
ing; (ii) amici are treated modularly, with a multiplicative
effect and no consideration of diminishing returns, tempo-
ral ordering, or reputation; (iii) the cost function does not
capture the intricacies of legal writing style (i.e., choice of
citations, artful language, etc.); (iv) the utility function does
not fully capture the agenda of each individual amicus; (v)
each amicus brief is treated independently (i.e., no sharing
across briefs with the same author), as we do not have ac-
cess to clean author metadata. Despite these simplifications,
the model is a useful tool for quantitative analysis and hy-
pothesis generation in support of substantive research on the
judiciary.
6 Related Work
Poole and Rosenthal (1985) introduced the IP model, us-
ing roll call data to infer latent positions of lawmakers.
Since then, many varieties of IP models have been pro-
posed for different voting scenarios: IP models for SCO-
TUS (Martin and Quinn 2002), multidimensional IP mod-
els for Congressional voting (Heckman and Snyder 1996;
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004), grounding multidimen-
sional IP models using topics learned from text of Congres-
sional bills (Gerrish and Blei 2012) and SCOTUS opinions
(Lauderdale and Clark 2014).
Amici have been studied extensively, especially their in-
fluence on SCOTUS (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Kearney
and Merrill 2000; Collins 2008; Corley, Collins, and Ham-
ner 2013). Collins (2007) found that justices can be influ-
enced by persuasive argumentation presented by organized
interests. These studies focus on ideology metadata (lib-
eral/conservative slant of amici, justices, decisions, etc.),
disregarding the rich signals encoded in the text of these
briefs, whereas we use text as evidence of utility maximizing
behavior to study the influence of amicus curiae.
Our model is also related to Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
who model the purposeful “slant” of profit-maximizing
newspapers looking to gain circulation from consumers with
a preference for such slant. More generally, extensive litera-
ture in econometrics estimates structural utility-based deci-
sions (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995, inter alia).
In addition to work on IP models, researchers have used
court opinions for authorship (Li et al. 2013) and historical
analysis, while oral argument transcripts have been used to
study power relationships (Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al.
2012; Prabhakaran, John, and Seligmann 2013) and prag-
matics (Goldwasser and Daume´ III 2014).
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a random utility model for persuasive
text; it is similar to a classical generative model and can be
estimated using familiar algorithms. The key distinction is
that persuasive text is modeled as a function of the addressee
and the particulars of the matter about which she is being
convinced; authors are agents seeking to maximize their ex-
pected utility in a given scenario. In the domain of SCO-
TUS, this leads to improved vote prediction performance, as
the model captures the structure of amicus briefs better than
simpler treatments of the text. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, our model is able to address interesting counterfactual
questions. Were some amicus briefs not filed, or had they
been written differently, or had the facts of the case been
presented differently, or had different justices presided, our
approach can estimate the resulting outcomes.
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Appendices
A Brief writing trade offs
Consider the first-order (or KKT) condition for the purpose-
ful amicus’ maximization w.r.t. the dth issue:18∑
j∈J σ
′ψj,dcs − ξ(∆d − θd)
=
∑
j∈J σ
′ψj,1cs − ξ(∆1 − θ1) if 0 < ∆d < 1
where σ′ is the first order derivative of the vote probabil-
ity sigmoid function. Optimality drives all topics (with pos-
itive weight) to have equal marginal values.19 The marginal
value highlights the tradeoffs an amicus faces, in four com-
ponents: (i) the cost of deviating from the merits, i.e., a large
difference between ∆d and θd, is ξ; (ii) a justice whose σ′
is large, i.e., whose vote is uncertain, receives greater atten-
tion, in particular (iii) on issues she cares about, i.e., ψj,d is
large, with (iv) cs controlling the strength of correspondence
to issues justices care about.
B Likelihood of Random Utility Ideal Point
Model
The likelihood of our amici model with random utility is
given below,
p(v, ρ,ψ,a, b, cp, r | λ,θ,∆, s)
∝
∏
j∈J
p(ψj | λ, ρ)
∏
i∈C
p(ai, bi, c
p, r
i | σ)
×
∏
i∈C
∏
j∈J
Vi,j
∏
k∈Ai
E[Ui,k]η
where
Vi,j = p(vi,j | ψj ,θi,∆i, ai, bi, cp, ri )
= σ [(1− vi,j)ai
+(1− vi,j)ψ>j (biθi + cpi∆pi + cri∆ri)
]
,
σ(x) = exp(x)1+exp(x) is the logistic function, and
E[Ui,k] =
∑
j∈J
σ
(
ai +ψ
>
j (biθi + c
si,k
i ∆i,k)
)
+ ξ
(
1− 1
2
‖∆i,k − θi‖22
)
18We consider inner points for clarity; if ∆d = 1, equality is
replaced with ≥ (respectively, 0 and ≤).
19Comparing each topic’s proportion to topic 1 is arbitrary. In a
D-topic model, the amicus has only D − 1 choices.
We add a constant to the expected utility term so that it
will always be ≥ 0. During each iteration of Gibbs sam-
pling, we sampled each latent variable ρ,ψj and [ai, bi, c
p, r
i ]
blockwise from the likelihood in turn using the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm. In each Metropolis-Hastings random
walk, we took 500 steps, ignoring the first 250 for burn-in
and keeping every 10th step to compute the mean, which we
use as our Gibbs update. In total, we performed 2,000 Gibbs
iterations over the training data.
Hyperparameters. We fixed the number of topics in our
model to 30. For LDA, the symmetric Dirichlet parame-
ter for document-topic and topic-word distributions are 0.1
and 0.001, respectively. For priors on the IP latent variables,
we follow the same settings used by Lauderdale and Clark
(2014), setting priors on case parameters, σ, to 4.0, and jus-
tice IPs component-wise variance, λ to 1.0. In the random
utility model, we set both hyperparameters η and ξ to 1.
C Data
We tokenized all the texts and tagged the tokens with the
Stanford part of speech tagger (Toutanova et al. 2003).
We extract n-grams with tags that follow the simple (but
effective) pattern (Adjective|Cardinal|Noun)+ Noun
(Justeson and Katz 1995), representing each document as a
“bag of phrases”, and filtering phrases that appear in less
than 25 or more than 3,000 documents obtaining a vocabu-
lary of 55,113 phrase types. Table 2 summarizes details of
our corpus.
Cases 2,074
w/amicus briefs 1,531
Max. briefs/case 76
Word tokens 110.5M
Phrase tokens 8.9M
Ave. words/brief 3,094
Ave. phrases/brief 339
Table 2: Corpus statistics ignoring amicus briefs whose
supporting side could not be automatically classified con-
fidently. In the last row, briefs include merits and amicus
briefs.
We manually labeled 1,241 randomly selected ami-
cus briefs with its side (petitioner, respondent, neither),
and trained a logistic regression classifier20 using lex-
ical and formatting features. We identified 5 sections
which are common across almost all briefs and used
them as features. The feature templates for our clas-
sifier are: 〈w〉, 〈title,w〉, 〈counsel,w〉, 〈introduction,w〉,
〈statement,w〉, 〈conclusion,w〉, where w can be any uni-
gram, bigram, or trigram.
We evaluated the performance of our classifier using 5
random splits, with 50% of our data for training, 30% for
testing, and 20% for the development set. We tuned the
`1-regularization weights on our dev set over the range of
20We used a C++ implementation of logistic regression classifier
available at https://github.com/redpony/creg.
coefficients {0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16}. The average accuracy of
our classifier is 79.1%. Limiting our evaluation to instances
whose posterior probability after classification is greater
than 0.8, we obtain 90.0% accuracy and recall of 52.1%.
Thus, we used 7,258 (out of 13,162) briefs that were classi-
fied as supporting neither side or whose posterior probability
is ≤ 0.8 (higher precision at the expense of recall).
D Topic Distribution
Table 3 lists the topics and top phrases estimated from our
dataset using LDA.
E Justices’ Ideal Points
The ideal points of justices vary depending on the issues. We
present the justices’ ideal points for each of the 30 topics in
Fig. 4.
F Amici Influence on Justices
Various justices have expressed opinions on the value of
amicus briefs. Some justices, such as Scalia, are known to
be dubious of amicus briefs, preferring to leave the task of
reading these briefs to their law clerks, who will pick out
any notable briefs for them.21 In contrast, recent surveys of
amicus citation rates in justice opinions have often ranked
Sotomayor and Ginsburg among justices who most often
cite amici in their opinions (Franze and Anderson 2011;
Walsh 2013).
For each justice, we compute the difference in vote log-
likelihood between the issues IP and random utility IP mod-
els, as a (noisy) measure of amici influence. A larger dif-
ference in suggests that more of a justice’s decision-making
can be explained by the presence of amicus briefs. Table 4
presents these differences, and the rankings are consistent
with extant hypotheses noted above. We take this consis-
tency as encouraging, in the spirit of the “preregistered” hy-
potheses of Sim et al. (2013), but caution that it does not
imply a conclusion about causation.
G Expected utility curve for hypothetical
amicus in Obamacare case
0.0/1.0 0.2/0.8 0.4/0.6 0.6/0.4 0.8/0.2 1.0/0.0
Proportions of individual mandate / interstate commerce
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
E
xp
ec
te
d
ut
ili
ty
Support NFIB
Support HHS
Figure 5: Expected utility when varying between propor-
tions of individual mandate and interstate commerce topics.
21See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-18 (2005) (Scalia
J., dissenting); also, “Dont re-plow the ground that you expect the
parties to plow unless you expect the parties to plow with a partic-
ularly dull plow” (attributed to Scalia on the California Appellate
Law Blog, http://bit.ly/1wOmlRE).
Justice Diff. (×.01)
John Paul Stevens 31.5
Clarence Thomas∗ 30.8
Thurgood Marshall 29.4
Elena Kagan∗ 28.9
Sonia Sotomayor∗ 24.7
John Roberts∗ 24.0
Ruth Bader Ginsburg∗ 23.9
William Rehnquist 23.8
Stephen Breyer∗ 22.2
David Souter 22.0
Samuel Alito∗ 21.8
Harry Blackmun 18.0
Byron White 16.9
Antonin Scalia∗ 16.6
Anthony Kennedy∗ 15.3
Sandra Day O’Connor 14.7
Table 4: Justices ordered by how much amicus briefs can
explain their votes, estimated as quadratic mean difference
in vote log-likelihood between the issues IP model and the
random utility IP model. ∗ denotes current sitting justices.
Fig. 5 illustrates the expected utility curve faced by a sin-
gle amicus as we vary the topic proportions of the individ-
ual mandate and interstate commerce topics. The model ex-
pects an amicus on NFIB’s side to get more votes and hence,
higher utility, as the model expects justices to be in favor of
NFIB prior to amici influence.
We note that interior solutions for the expected utility op-
timization only exist when proportions are ∈ (0, 1). During
our experiment, we set the proportions of inactive topics to
10−8 instead of 0.
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# Topic Top phrases
1 Criminal procedure
(1)
reasonable doubt, supervised release, grand jury, prior conviction, plea agreement, controlled substance,
guilty plea, double jeopardy clause, sixth amendment, jury trial
2 Employment erisa plan, plan administrator, employee benefit plan, insurance company, pension plan, health care, plan
participant, individual mandate, fiduciary duty, health insurance
3 Due process due process clause, equal protection clause, fundamental right, domestic violence, equal protection, state
interest, d e, assisted suicide, controlled substance, rational basis
4 Indians m r, m s, indian tribe, tribal court, indian country, fifth amendment, miranda warning, indian affair, vice
president, tribal member
5 Economic activity attorney fee, limitation period, hobbs act, security law, rule 10b, actual damage, racketeering activity, fidu-
ciary duty, loss causation, security exchange act
6 Bankruptcy law bankruptcy court, bankruptcy code, 1996 act, state commission, telecommunication service, network ele-
ment, eighth circuit, new entrant, pole attachment, communication act
7 Voting rights voting right, minority voter, j app, voting right act, covered jurisdiction, fifteenth amendment, redistricting
plan, political process, political subdivision, minority group
8 First amendment first amendment right, commercial speech, strict scrutiny, cable operator, free speech, first amendment pro-
tection, protected speech, child pornography, government interest, public forum
9 Taxation interstate commerce, commerce clause, state tax, tax court, gross income, internal revenue code, income tax,
dormant commerce clause, state taxation, sale tax
10 Amicus briefs national association, amicus brief, vast majority, brief amicus curia, large number, wide range, recent year,
public policy, wide variety, washington dc
11 Labor management north carolina, collective bargaining agreement, confrontation clause, sta t, north platte river, collective bar-
gaining, inland lake, laramie river, labor organization, re v
12 Civil action class action, class member, injunctive relief, final judgment, federal claim, civil action, preliminary injunc-
tion, class certification, civil procedure, subject matter jurisdiction
13 Civil rights title vii, title vi, civil right act, age discrimination, sexual harassment, old worker, major life activity, reason-
able accommodation, prima facie case, disparate impact
14 State sovereign sovereign immunity, eleventh amendment, state official, absolute immunity, false claim, private party, 42 usc
1983, state sovereign immunity, eleventh amendment immunity, federal employee
15 Federal administra-
tions
federal agency, statutory construction, plain meaning, other provision, statutory text, dc circuit, sub (a), fiscal
year, senate report, agency action
16 Interstate relations special master, new mexico, prejudgment interest, arkansas river, rt vol, comp act, new jersey, elli island,
john martin reservoir, video game
17 Court of Appeals eleventh circuit, sixth circuit, circuit court, fourth circuit, oral argument, tenth circuit, further proceeding,
appeal decision, instant case, defendant motion
18 Fourth amendment fourth amendment, probable cause, arbitration agreement, police officer, national bank, search warrant, ex-
clusionary rule, arbitration clause, reasonable suspicion, law enforcement officer
19 Eighth amendment eighth amendment, sex offender, prison official, facto clause, copyright act, copyright owner, unusual pun-
ishment, public domain, liberty interest, public safety
20 International law international law, foreign state, vienna convention, human right, foreign country, foreign government, jones
act, united kingdom, native hawaiian, foreign nation
21 Equal protection
clause
peremptory challenge, law school, equal protection clause, strict scrutiny, high education, racial discrimina-
tion, prima facie case, school district, consent decree, compelling interest
22 Commerce clause
(2)
interstate commerce, commerce clause, local government, political subdivision, state regulation, supremacy
clause, federal regulation, tobacco product, tenth amendment, federal fund
23 Immigration law judicial review, immigration law, final order, removal proceeding, immigration judge, due process clause,
deportation proceeding, administrative remedy, compliance order, time limit
24 Death penalty death penalty, habeas corpus, reasonable doubt, trial judge, death sentence, ineffective assistance, direct
appeal, defense counsel, new rule, mitigating evidence
25 Environmental
issues
navigable water, clean water act, colorado river, special master, project act, public land, fill material, water
right, point source, lake mead
26 Establishment
clause
establishment clause, school district, public school, private school, religious school, ten commandment, boy
scout, religious belief, religious organization, free exercise clause
27 Patent law federal circuit, patent law, prior art, subject matter, expert testimony, lanham act, hazardous substance, patent
system, patent act, new drug
28 Antitrust law antitrust law, sherman act, contr act, market power, postal service, joint venture, natural gas, high price,
public utility, interstate commerce
29 Election law political party, taking clause, private property, property owner, fifth amendment, independent expenditure,
federal election, property right, contribution limit, general election
30 Criminal procedure
(2)
punitive damage, habeas corpus, second amendment, punitive damage award, enemy combatant, military
commission, compensatory damage, state farm, new trial, due process clause
Table 3: Topics and top-10 phrases estimated from briefs using LDA. We manually annotated each topic with the topic labels.
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